UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

11-20-2012

Idaho Trust Bank v. Christian Appellant's Reply
Brief Dckt. 39781

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Idaho Trust Bank v. Christian Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 39781" (2012). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 3933.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3933

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

IDAHO TRUST BANK, an Idaho )
corporation, flkJa Idaho Trust National )
Bank,
)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
vs.
)
)
MICHAEL R. CHRISTIAN, an individual; )
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
I

Supreme Court Case No. 39781

--------------------------------

REPL Y BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofIdaho,
in and for the County of Ada
The Honorable Cheri C. Copsey, District Judge, Presiding

Barry Marcus, ISB No. 1181

Fredric V. Shoemaker

Marcus, Christian, Hardee & Davies, LLP

Loren K. Messerly
Greener Burke Shoemaker, PA

737 North i h Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

Attorneys for Defelldant-Appellallt

950 West Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, Idaho 83702

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I.

INTRODUCTION

1

II.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY

2

A.

ITB continues to ignore the Qlain meaning of the Qrimary
definition of the guarantied "Indebtedness," reQlacing it
with its own various definitions and effectively reading
language out of the Guaranty Agreement.

2

B.

A broad interQretation which swallows the clearly defined
limitation in the scoQe of the guaranty, by reference to
subsequent modifiers, is imQroQer.

8

C.

The only definition of "owes" Qroduced by ITB from an
outside source actually favors Christian.

11

D.

The result reached by the District Court violated the very
rules of interQretation it QUffiorted to enforce in its
decision.

12

E.

ITB's argument that the guarantor cannot rely on defenses
the borrower might raise misses the Qoint, as the definition
of "Indebtedness" makes the scoQe of the guaranty
deQendent uQon an existing obligation of the borrower.

16

F.

ITB's factual mischaracterizations and references to facts
not in the record are irrelevant.

18

G.

The statutory Qrovision that a secured Qromissory note is
unenforceable unless the underlying deed of trust is
foreclosed aQQlies to ITB, and its argument to the contrary
is frivolous.

18

III.

CONCLUSION

20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Bakkerv. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 190 (2005) ................................................... 10
Bel-Ken Assoc. L.P. v. Clark, 83 B.R. 357 (D. Md. 1988) .......................................................................... 7
Bloom v. Bender, 48 Cal.2d 793, 313 P.2d 568 (1957) ............................................................................... 7
CIT Fin. Servs. v. Herb's Indoor RV Ctr., 118 Idaho 185, 191 (Ct. App. 1990) ..................................... 4, 17
Cohen v. Disner, 36 Cal. App. 4th 855, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 782, 785 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995) ....................... 5
First Interstate Bank v. Eisenbarth, 123 Idaho 895, 898 (Ct. App. 1993) .................................................. 19
First Sec. Bank ond. v. Gaige, 115 Idaho 172 (1988) ............................................................................... 16
Harrison v. Mason, 191 So. 916, 919 (Ala. 1939) ........................................................................................ 5
In re Airadigm Comm's, Inc., 519 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2008) ......................................................................... 7
In re Leggett, 335 B.R. 227, 230 (N.D. Ga. 2005) ....................................................................................... 5
In re Lockard, 884 F.2d 1171 (9 th Cir. 1989) ............................................................................................... 7
Industrial Investment Corp. v. Rocca, 100 Idaho 228, 233 (1979) .............................................................. 4
Kirkeby-Natus Corp. v. Kramlich, 12 Ariz. App. 376, 382, 470 P.2d 696 (1970) ..................................... 10
Madrid v. Roth, 134 Idaho 802,806 (Ct. App. 2000) ................................................................................ 13
McNulty v. McDonald, 631 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D. Me. 2009) ....................................................................... 7
Musselman v. Wise, 84 Ind. 248, 250 (1882) ............................................................................................... 5
R.I.D.C. Ind. Dev. Fund v. Snyder, 539 F.2d 487 (5 th Cir. 1976) ................................................................ 7
Roeder Mining, Inc. v. Johnson, 118 Idaho 96, 97 (1990) ......................................................................... 13
Salitan v. Magnus, 62 N.J. Super. 323, 162 A.2d 883, 889, 891 (N.J. Super., App. Div. 1960) ...... 5, 17, 18
Seymour v. Weinberg, 2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 1227 (Ct. App. 2005) .................................................... 10
Shattuck v. People, 5 III. 477, 480 (1843) .................................................................................................... 6
Stucki v. Parker, 108 Idaho 929 (1985) ............................................................................................... 8, 9, 10
Swanson v. Beco Constr. Co., 145 Idaho 59, 63 (2008) ............................................................................. 13
Valley Bank v. Larson, 104 Idaho 772 (1983) ........................................................................................... 17
Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 71 U.S. 535,552 (1867) .................................................................................... 11

Statutes
Idaho Code § 45-1503 ........................................................................................................................... 16,19
Idaho Code § 45-1503(1) ............................................................................................................................ 19
Idaho Code § 45-1512 ........................................................................................................................... 16, 19

Other Authorities
Black's Law Dictionary (5 tl1 ed. 1979) ....................................................................................................... 13

Black's Law Dictionary (SUI ed.
Black's Law Dictionary (5 th ed.
Black's Law Dictionary (5 th ed.
Black's Law Dictionary (5 th ed.

1979) at 99 ................................................................................................ 6
1979) at 153 ............................................................................................ 11
1979) at 363, 364 ..................................................................................... 12
1979) at 968 ............................................................................................ 11

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Guaranty Agreement defines the guaranteed "Indebtedness" as "amounts
Borrower owes or will owe Lender." This is the express scope of the guarantor's liability under
the Agreement. The plain and ordinary meaning of "owes" has been widely held to mean
"subject to an enforceable duty or obligation." The controlling issue in this case is whether the
Agreement can be interpreted by reference to other language to unambiguously include amounts
the Borrower no longer has an enforceable obligation. The Lender, ITB, drafted the Agreement
and voluntarily took steps to eliminate the Borrower's obligation to repay.
Virtually every argument raised by ITB in its brief was addressed and rebutted in
Christian's opening brief, and we refer the Court back to that brief. Generally, however:
(a)

ITB argues that various waivers contained in the Guaranty Agreement

transform it into an absolute guaranty of any amount borrowed but not repaid. The problem is
that ITB' s interpretation of other provisions in the Agreement clearly eviscerates the plain
meaning of the definition of the guarantied "Indebtedness" as amounts "Borrower owes or will
owe." Moreover, it negates the Agreement's description of this definition as a "limitation on
liability."
(b)

ITB argues that giving the definition of the guarantied "Indebtedness" -

amounts the Borrower "owes or will owe Lender" - its plain and ordinary meaning results in a
conflict with the way in which it interprets other parts of the Agreement.
argument establishes the ambiguity of the document that it drafted.
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At best, ITB's

(c) ITB argues that the word "owes" does not "exclusively" mean "legally
enforceable" but commonly means "to be under an obligation to payor repay," or "indebted,"
but this only further supports Christian's position, since the plain meanings of those terms also
include the concept of enforceability; and
(d) Despite the clear language of the applicable statute that a secured promissory
note may not be enforced unless the deed of trust is foreclosed, ITB argues that somehow this
provision does not apply where ITB chose not to foreclose but instead used a receivership to sell
the collateral.
We discuss these points further below.
II.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY

A. ITB continues to ignore the plain meaning of the primary
definition of the guarantied "Indebtedness," replacing it
with its own various definitions and effectively reading
language out of the Guarantv Agreement.

ITB asserts throughout its brief that the Guaranty Agreement is an "absolute and
unconditional personal guaranty" of "all of the debt that the principal debtor incurred but did not
pay," (see Respondent's Brief, p. 1), that the Agreement "unambiguously obligates the guarantor
on the entirety of the debt that remains unpaid," (Respondent's Brief, p. 3), and that the Guaranty
is "unambiguous in its language holding Christian liable for amounts ... incurred but unpaid[.]"
(Respondent's Brief, p. 11). Similarly, ITB asserts that "the Guaranty unambiguously provides
that the guarantor is agreeing that he will remain liable for all those amounts incurred,
irrespective of what defenses the borrower may have ... The only defense for the guarantor is
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that the debt is 'fully and finally paid. '" (Emphasis added). Respondent's Brief, p. 14. This of
course ignores the operative tenn "Indebtedness" - and its definition in the agreement as
"amounts .... Borrower owes or will owe Lender." It wishes to replace the stated definition with
terms like "those amounts incurred" and "the debt." In fact, the Guaranty Agreement states that
the guaranty will continue "until all the Indebtedness . .. shall have been fully and finally paid
and satisfied." By definition, ifthere is no "Indebtedness," the guaranty does not continue. l ITB
could have drafted the Agreement to clearly provide that what is guaranteed is the amount
borrowed and not repaid "for whatever reason" (to use the District Court's phrasing), but chose
not to.
The Guaranty Agreement states the opposite in more than one place.

What is

guaranteed is "the Indebtedness," and that in turn is expressly defined as amounts the borrower
"owes or will owe Lender." This is facially different from the terms used by ITB. The Guaranty
Agreement itself describes the definition of "Indebtedness as a "limitation on liability." ITB's
reading eliminates this language from the Agreement, which is exactly what ITB accuses
Appellant of doing.
Not surprisingly, when it goes through the exercise of parsing the Guaranty
Agreement, underlining various parts, ITB does not underline the key language that actually
This is similar to ITB's approach below. In its opposition to Christian's motion for summary
judgment, ITB argued variously that Christian guarantied or was obligated for "the loan" See Plaintiff's
Opposition to Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, CR 243, at p. 3), "all debt incurred by
Trinity but not paid by Trinity" (ld.), "any obligation/debt incurred by the borrower" (see Id., p. 6), "all of
borrower's indebtedness under the promissory note" (ld., p. 9), "all amounts that Trinity incurred" (Id., p.
16), and, vaguely, "the balance" (ld.). ITB studiously avoided using the actual definition of the
guarantied "Indebtedness."
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defines the guarantied "Indebtedness," i.e. the "amounts ... BOlTower ... owes or will owe to
Lender." See Respondent's Brief, p. 12.
ITB argues: "This form of Guaranty was drafted specifically to anticipate and
refute just the type of argument that Christian has raised, which has been raised so many times
before." See Respondent's Brief, p. 15.

This is false. There is no evidence in the record to

support ITB's assertion, and the case it cites does not do so. The District Court admitted that it
had never seen the definition of "Indebtedness" raised before. ITB's argument is akin to the
District Court's unsupported conclusion that the general "purpose of a guaranty" (without
reference to what the agreement actually says is being guarantied) is to allow the lender to
recover in any circumstance for any amount remaining unpaid by its borrower.

See Tr., p. 48

("The purpose of a personal guaranty is to insure that the lender is paid in the event that the
borrower can't pay for whatever reason. It doesn't make any difference what the reason is that
the debtor can't pay.").
In fact, this Court has repeatedly stated the opposite rule, when it has stated that
the scope of a guaranty agreement is to be strictly construed, and that a guaranty will not be
expanded by implication beyond the express terms of the guaranty agreement.

Industrial

Investment Corp. v. Rocca, 100 Idaho 228, 233 (1979) ("A guarantor, like a surety, has been
held to be a favorite of the law and his liability is not to be extended by implication beyond the
express limits or terms of the instrument, or its plain intent."); see also CIT Fin. Servs. v. Herb's
Indoor

RV

Ctr., 118

Idaho

185,

191

(Ct.

App.

1990)

("Guaranty instruments

are strictly construed. A guarantor's obligations are limited to those expressly recited in the
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guaranty instrument." (Emphasis added)). If ITB's position is adopted, these cases will mean

nothing. Following the rules stated by these cases requires more than merely paying them lip
servIce.
As Christian has pointed out, courts from several jurisdictions have recognized, in
several contexts over a span of more than 150 years, that the plain and ordinary meaning of
"owes" includes the concept of a legal, enforceable duty to repay. Cohen v. Disner, 36 Cal. App.
4th 855, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 782, 785 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995) ("The plain meaning of 'to owe' is 'to
be under obligation to payor repay in return for something received.' ... If the maker has no
enforceable obligation to pay a dishonored check, there is no amount 'owing upon that check'
under the plain language of section 1719."); Salitan v. Magnus, 62 N.J. Super. 323, 162 A.2d
883, 891 (N.l Super., App. Div. 1960) (Where defendants guaranteed all obligations which the
borrower "may at any time owe", guaranty could not be enforced where there remained "no
subsisting corporate liability" of borrower); In re Leggett, 335 B.R. 227, 230 (N.D. Ga. 2005)
("The Bankruptcy Code expressly defines 'debt' as 'liability on a claim,' ... and the plain
meaning of 'owe' is 'to be under an obligation to pay.' ... The Debtor's eligibility in this case,
therefore, depends on whether the Debtor owed [the creditor] a debt on the filing date, that is,
whether he was liable on [the creditor'S] claim."); Harrison v. Mason, 191 So. 916, 919 (Ala.
1939)("[T]he word 'owes' is defined as meaning 'obligated or bound to pay."'); Matter of
Liquidation of Midland Ins. Co., 16 N.Y.3d 536; 947 N.E.2d 1174 (Ct. App. N.Y. 2011) ("We
interpret 'justly owing' to mean the amount Midland would have been obligated to pay its Major
Policyholder had it remained solvent."); Musselman v. Wise, 84 Ind. 248, 250 (1882) ("to owe"
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means "to be obliged or bound to pay"); Shattuck v. People, 5 Ill. 477, 480 (1843) ("owes" has
the "same force and meaning" as "held and firmly bound to pay")?
The District Court nevertheless effectively ruled, and ITB asks this Court to
affirm, that the plain and ordinary meaning of "amounts Borrower owes or will owe Lender" is
"amounts Borrower is no longer obliged to repay because of Lender's own choice to eliminate
Borrower's further obligation." To affirm the District Court, this Court would have to either: (a)
conclude that the plain and ordinary meaning of "amounts Borrower owes" is the opposite of
what virtually every relevant decision or dictionary definition states; or (b) announce a new rule
that interpreting a term directly contrary to its plain and ordinary meaning is acceptable to avoid
finding an ambiguity. The first would of course be absurd. The second would upend established
rules of contract interpretation. In this case, the Court would have to do so where ITB both
drafted the guaranty to define the guaranty obligation as amounts owed and then, by its own
choice to bypass foreclosure, eliminated the borrower's further obligation to it.
ITB simply asserts that all of this authority is irrelevant and distinguishable (even
though some of the decisions also involved guaranty agreements). This is similar to the District
Court's summary dismissal of the authority on the basis that the decisions involved other
Various dictionaries define "owe" similarly. Black's Law Dictionary, (5 th Ed. 1979) at 99 ("To
be bound to do or omit something, especially to pay a debt."); http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/owe ("to be under obligation to payor repay in return for something received");
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/owe(''tobeunderobligationtopayorrepay'').This court
regularly refers to ordinary and legal dictionaries to discern the plain meaning of terms. E.g., Curlee v.
Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391 (2008) (interpreting "investigation"); Huyett v. Idaho
State Univ., 140 Idaho 904 (2004) (interpreting "subject to").
2
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"circumstances." In fact, the cases are notable and persuasive precisely because they involved a
broad range of settings, yet courts consistently acknowledged that "owes" plainly means
"obligated or bound to repay." The "circumstances" are not a distinguishing factor.
While ITB asserts that for every case cited by Appellant it "can cite five cases
that hold a guaranty's language is intended to hold a guarantor liable even when the debt is no
longer legally enforceable against the borrower," none of the cases it cites turn on a definition of
the scope of the guaranty obligation which is expressly stated in terms of the principal debtor's
continuing liability. See Respondent's Brief, pp. 27-28. In re Airadigm Comm's, Inc., 519 F.3d
640

(7th

Cir. 2008) involved the question of whether a bankruptcy court can release a non-debtor

from creditor liability over the objections of the creditor. In re Lockard, 884 F.2d 1171 (9 th Cir.
1989) involved the question of surety bond issued by a third party became property of the estate
of a bankruptcy contractor, such that the bankruptcy court could prohibit state court claims
against the bond. R.I.D.C. Ind. Dev. Fund v. Snyder, 539 F.2d 487 (5 th Cir. 1976) involved the
effect of a bankruptcy reorganization upon a guaranty under a section of the Bankruptcy Act
which has since been repealed.

McNulty v. McDonald, 631 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D. Me. 2009)

involved the question of whether certain claims were subject to mandatory arbitration. The court
there merely recognized that as a general matter a debtor's bankruptcy filing, by itself, does not
affect a guarantor's obligation (one way or another). The court in Bel-Ken Assoc. L.P. v. Clark,
83 B.R. 357 (D. Md. 1988) did the same. The court in Bloom v. Bender, 48 Ca1.2d 793, 313
P.2d 568 (1957) likewise stated general rules regarding guaranties and the definition of the scope
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of the guaranty obligation was not raised. None of these cases deters from the authority cited by
Christian more directly addressing the issue at hand.
B. A broad interpretation which swallows the clearlv defined
limitation in the scope of the guaranty, by reference to
subsequent modifiers, is improper.
The assertion by the District Court and ITB that Christian has somehow wrongly
focused on "a single word" in the Guaranty Agreement is incorrect. Christian has focused on the
plain meaning of the sentence which defines the scope of the guaranty obligation, which is the
core of the document, while ITB and the District Court relied on other parts of the Agreement to
nullify that sentence's plain and ordinary meaning. This is the crux of the dispute: whether,
under the guise of "giving meaning to all terms" in the Agreement, the Court may override the
plain and ordinary meaning of the primary definitional term of the contract.
Stucki v. Parker, 108 Idaho 929 (1985) is similar to this case, and is instructive.
In Stucki, a deed contained a grant of "[a]ll of the surface rights in and to and upon" the
described lands, but then provided: "The Grantor herein, however, reserves unto itself all the
phosphate and phosphate rock in the lands above described, and reserves to it or persons
authorized by it, the right to prospect for, mine, and remove such deposits from the same." 108
Idaho at 930. The successor in interest to the grantor sued to quiet title in itself to all of the
mineral interest in the property. The trial court concluded that the deed unambiguously reserved
to the grantor only the phosphate deposits in the land (although elsewhere it also concluded that
the word "surface" was ambiguous) and in light of the reservation, construed the granting
language broadly and against the Grantor. It concluded that while the deed "conveyed only the
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surface rights, the specific reservation out of the grant indicates that only mineral rights

ill

phosphate were reserved," and quieted title to all other minerals in the grantee. Id.
This Court disagreed and reversed. It correctly recognized that the expansive
interpretation given the modifying reservation by the trial court rendered the limited primary
grant meaningless, stating:
The correct interpretation of a deed which conveys the surface and
then lists specific reservations is this: the reservations relate only to
that which was first conveyed, the surface. Without a construction
in this manner, the insertion of the word surface becomes
meaningless and only the reservation is of any import. When the
grantor conveys the surface he means just that -- a conveyance of
the surface, and to hold otherwise controverts the clear intention of
the grantor.
Id. at 931.

The Court reasoned that the grant of the "surface" was a limitation on the rights

granted, and the subsequent reservation could not expand those rights beyond what was
expressly granted. In other words, the Court correctly concluded that the plain meaning of a
grant of the "surface" did not include subsurface minerals, and to interpret the deed otherwise
would conflict with that plain and ordinary meaning and effectively read the term out of the
deed.
Similarly, where a rule of guaranty agreements is that the guaranty obligation
will be strictly (not broadly) construed and will not be expanded by implication, the language

stating the express scope of the guaranty obligation is of primary importance.

Where that

obligation is defined by words that have a plain and ordinary meaning, interpreting the
agreement broadly by reference to other language in it, in a way which contradicts the plain and
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ordinary definition of the guaranty obligation, violates the rule and cannot be proper. This
Court's decision in Stucki v. Parker should guide its resolution of this case. 3
The District Court essentially chose the rule regarding giving effect to all parts of
a contract over the rule requiring that contract terms be given their plain and ordinary meaning,
in order to avoid ambiguity at all costs. This is where the District Court erred. Other courts have
recognized that the rules have the reverse priority, and that terms cannot be interpreted contrary
to their plain meaning to avoid an ambiguity.

See,~,

Kirkeby-Natus Corp. v. Kramlich, 12

Ariz. App. 376, 382, 470 P.2d 696 (1970) ("It is true that a construction which gives effect to all
portions of a contract is to be preferred to an interpretation which leaves one or some parts
without effect. ... But this principle, like the principle that doubtful language is to be construed
against the draftsman, is a secondary rule of contract interpretation... .It is not a mandate to give
an operative effect to a provision in a contract which clearly was not intended to have such an
effect." (citations omitted)).

This is clear from the rule often stated by this court that an

"unambiguous contract will be given its plain meaning." Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham,
LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 190 (2005). A court cannot simultaneously conclude that a contract is
unambiguous and then give it a reading contrary to the plain meaning of one of its terms.

Stucki is similar to the decision in Seymour v. Weinberg, 2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 1227 (et.
App. 2005), where the guaranty agreement provided that it covered "the indebtedness evidenced by a
certain promissory note" in the amount of $95,000, but then stated that the "indebtedness includes all
indebtedness and all obligations owing now or in the future of Creditor by Debtor[.]" The Michigan
Couli of Appeals rejected the lender's argument that the second clause expanded the initial definition of
what was guaranteed, and concluded that the second clause "irreconcilably conflicts" with the first
definition of the guaranteed amount. As a result, the court reasoned, the "defendant's clearly expressed or
manifested intent to guarantee any future loans is absent because of the ambiguity in the language of the
Guaranty."
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C. The onlv definition of "owes" produced by ITB from an

outside source actually favors Christian.
ITB asserts that, even though several courts have concluded "owes" plainly means
subject to an enforceable obligation to repay, this definition is not "exclusive" and the word is
"commonly used" with a meaning lacking any notion of enforceability. See Respondent's Brief,
p. 18. In fact, the definition quoted by ITB (the only authority ITB ever cites to support its
argument about the meaning of the term "owes") actually confirms the correctness of Christian's
position: It describes "owe" as meaning "to be under an obligation to payor repay in return for
something received," or "to be indebted to." Id. The term "obligation" includes the element of
enforceability. Black's describes "obligation" as meaning "[t]hat which a person is bound to
do," and which "renders a person liable to coercion and punishment."

Black's Law Dictionary

(5 th ed. 1979) at 968 (emphasis added). It further describes the "obligation of a contract" as
follows: "That which the law in force when contract is made obliges parties to do or not to do,
and the remedy and legal means to carry it into effect . .. The term includes everything within the
obligatory scope of the contract, and it includes the means of enforcement." Id. at 969 (emphasis
added).4 The necessary corollary is that when a duty is no longer enforceable, one is no longer
"obligated." In the context of a duty of payment, using the very definition quoted by ITB, it
means that one no longer "owes" the amount. When ITB chose to dispose of its collateral
Obligation" is defined similarly elsewhere. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/obligation
("an agreement enforceable by law," and "a binding promise, contract, sense of duty, etc." (emphasis
added)); http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/obligation ("a binding agreement committing a
person to a payment or other action" (emphasis added)). Black's likewise defines a "binding agreement"
as a "contract which is enforceable." Black's Law Dictionary (5 th ed. 1979) at 153. The United States
Supreme Court long ago recognized: "Nothing can be more material to the obligation than the means of
enforcement." Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 71 U.S. 535,552 (1867).
4
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through a receivership and forego the ability to obtain a deficiency judgment against its
borrower, the borrower no longer had an obligation to repay anything to ITB.

Under the

definition quoted by ITB, the borrower no longer "owed" ITB anything.
Likewise, Black's defines a "debt" as: "A specified sum of money owing to one
person from another, including not only obligation of debtor to pay but right of creditor to

receive and enforce payment." Black's Law Dictionary (5 th ed. 1979) at 363 (emphasis added).
It defines a "debtor" as: "One who owes a debt; he who may be compelled to pay a claim or

demand[.]" Id. at 364 (emphasis added). Thus, one who may no longer be compelled to repay
an amount, and against whom a claim is unenforceable, is no longer "indebted."
There simply is no basis for ITB's assertion that the plain meaning of "amounts
Borrower owes or will owe Lender" does not include the element of enforceability.
D. The result reached by the District Court violated the very
rules of interpretation it purported to enforce in its
decision.

The logical conclusion ofITB's position, and the District Court's decision, is that

no limited definition of a guaranty obligation will ever be effective in the face of the other
language in the guaranty relied upon by ITB.

This of course means that the District Court

committed exactly the interpretive sin of which ITB accuses Christian.

It is reading the

expressly defined scope of the guaranty obligation out of the document (by giving it exactly the
opposite of its plain and ordinary meaning), to reach the point that the guarantor is liable for
whatever amount that was borrowed and remains unpaid, no matter what the definition of the
guaranty obligation says. It is also reading out of the document the language at the end of the
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section including the definition of "Indebtedness" which describes it as a "limitation on
liability." According to ITB, there is no limitation on the guarantor's liability. In doing so it
also renders that language a nullity.
The basic issue in this case, which ITB attempts to obscure, is whether all of the
language it relies upon can take the central term defining the Guaranty obligation - "amounts the
Borrower owes or will owe Lender" - and turn it completely on its head from its plain and
ordinary meaning as recognized by Black's Law Dictionary and several courts and other
dictionaries. ITB would have the Court believe that the amounts owed by the Borrower include
those "amounts the Borrower is no longer under an obligation to repay." Again, ITB's argument
effectively reads the primary defining language of the guaranty obligation (and the descriptor of
it as a "limitation of liability" later in the same section) out of the Agreement.

It also violates

the rule that words in a contract are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Swanson v.
Beco Constr. Co., 145 Idaho 59, 63 (2008).
While a court will harmonize terms in an agreement if it is reasonably possible to
do so, it cannot do so by reading some language out of the agreement. Where no interpretation is
possible which does not do damage to some part of the agreement, the document is ambiguous.
Madrid v. Roth, 134 Idaho 802, 806 (Ct. App. 2000) (contract is ambiguous if its terms are
"contradictory to and inconsistent with" each other); Roeder Mining, Inc. v. Johnson, 118 Idaho
96, 97 (1990) (contract is ambiguous if it "contains absurdities or contradictions"). The problem
here, as Christian explained in his opening brief, is that as interpreted by ITB and the District
Court, the second sentence which includes examples of "Indebtedness" creates a direct conflict
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with the plain meaning of the first sentence which defines "Indebtedness." The reading given by
ITB and the District Court is, essentially:
"Indebtedness" means all amounts Borrower owes or will owe
Lender. "Indebtedness" includes amounts incurred by Borrower
that are barred or unenforceable against Borrower for any reason
whatsoever (and Borrower thus no longer owes).
This is absurd and contradictory, and therefore a patent ambiguity.
ITB and the District Court both relied heavily upon the sentence following the
definition of the guarantied "Indebtedness" which lists examples of amounts which may be owed
by the Borrower, and particular language which provides that certain amounts which may be
"barred or unenforceable against the Borrower" may be part of the Indebtedness. That entire
sentence is as follows:
Indebtedness includes, without limitation, loans, advances, debts,
overdraft indebtedness, credit card indebtedness, lease obligations,
other obligations, and liabilities of Borrower, and any present and
future judgments against Borrower, future advances, loans or
transactions that renew, extend, modify, refinance, consolidate
or substitute these debts, liabilities and obligations whether:
voluntarily or involuntarily incurred; due or to become due by their
terms or acceleration; absolute or contingent; liquidated or
unliquidated; determined or undetermined; direct or indirect;
primary or secondary in nature or arising from a guaranty or
surety; secured or unsecured; joint or several or joint and several;
evidenced by a negotiable or non negotiable instrument or writing;
originated by Lender or another or others; barred or
unenforceable against Borrower for any reason whatsoever; for
any transactions that may be voidable for any reason (such as
infancy, insanity, ultra vires or otherwise); and originated then
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reduced or extinguished and then afterwards increased or
reinstated.
As Christian explained in his opening brief, this sentence can be more reasonably
(and grammatically) read to avoid eliminating the plain meaning of "owes" from the definition of
"Indebtedness" in the sentence that precedes it.

The language relied upon by ITB and the

District Court actually provides that a revived or substituted debt is guaranteed even though the
initial debt may have been barred or unenforceable. Grammatically, the language relied upon by
ITB and the District Court modifies only that language following either the word "and" or the
word "or" as emphasized above, as the comma before each of these words indicates that the
language which follows is separated from the preceding part of the sentence. The sentence
provides, in essence, that:
"Indebtedness" includes any present or future judgments against Borrower, future
advances, loans or transactions that renew, extend, modify, refinance, consolidate
or substitute these debts, liabilities and obligations whether [these debts,
liabilities and obligations that are renewed, extended, modified, refinanced,
consolidated, or substituted, are] barred or unenforceable against Borrower for
any reason whatsoever.
This is a more reasonable interpretation because the clause that is modified
appears in closer proximity to the modifying phrase than that suggested by the Court and because
it harmonizes with, and doesn't conflict with, the plain meaning of "owes." If the second
sentence admits of two reasonable interpretations it is ambiguous. If it is ambiguous it must be
interpreted in favor of the guarantor. The District COUli erred in interpreting this ambiguous
provision in favor of the ITB.
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E. ITB's argument that the guarantor cannot rely on defenses
the borrower might raise misses the point, as the definition
of "Indebtedness" makes the scope of the guaranty
dependent upon an existing obligation of the borrower.
ITB argues that "Debtor cannot rely upon certain legal protections that the
principal debtor might raise". This is obfuscation, which Christian already addressed in his
opening brief. See Appellant's Brief, p. 22-26, 28-29. Christian has never tried to directly rely
upon the principal debtor's available defenses. He has only relied (as is his right) upon the
guaranty's definition of the guaranty obligation - amounts the Borrower "owes or will owe."
Idaho Code § 45-1503 and § 45-1512 do impact whether the borrower, Trinity, "owes" any
remaining amount to ITB, and thus whether there remains any "Indebtedness." This is a direct
result of ITB's own definition of the guarantied obligation, the "Indebtedness." None of the
decisions cited by ITB contain any indication that the guarantor's obligation was limited to an
"Indebtedness" defined to mean only those amounts the borrower "owes." The decisions are
irrelevant to this case.
In First Sec. Bank of Id. v. Gaige, 115 Idaho 172 (1988), the court rejected the
guarantor's argument that direct recourse to the anti-deficiency laws should be extended to
guarantors on public policy grounds. As discussed above, the same issue is not implicated in this
case. The statutes are relevant only insofar as they caused the borrower's liability to ITB to be
extinguished as a result of its choice in disposing of the collateral, and because the Guaranty
Agreement expressly limits the guaranty obligation to those amounts which the borrower still
"owes" to ITB, i.e., those amounts for which it remains liable to ITB. Gaige and cases like it
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would be relevant only if ITB had drafted the Guaranty Agreement to define the guaranty
obligation in terms of amounts borrowed, rather than amounts still owed.
ITB cites Valley Bank v. Larson, 104 Idaho 772 (1983) and CIT Financial
Services v. Herb's Indoor RV Center, Inc., 118 Idaho 185 (Ct. App. 1990) for the proposition
that "the guarantor's obligation ... is independent and parallel to the borrower's obligation, such
that the creditor's decision not to collect against the borrower ... is completely irrelevant."
Respondent's Brief, pp. 13-14. While this might be true had the guaranteed "Indebtedness" been
defined by ITB differently, when it defined that obligation as covering amounts the Borrower
"owes or will owe," it necessarily made the guaranty obligation dependent upon an existing
obligation of the Borrower to repay.

Neither Valley Bank nor CIT Financial Services has

anything do to with interpreting a definition of the scope of the guaranty obligation. If there is
no guarantied amount remaining -- here, no "Indebtedness" -- the waivers they discuss never
come into play.
As the court correctly observed in Salitan v. Magnus, 62 N.J. Super. 323, 162
A.2d 883, 889, 891 (N.J. Super., App. Div. 1960), where the guaranty obligation was defined as
amounts the borrower "may at any time owe," this made the guarantor's obligation depend on
the existence of an obligation by the borrower to repay.

The court there stated that "although

defendants' liability on the contract of guaranty is direct and unconditional in the sense that it
was enforceable by plaintiffs without the necessity of first obtaining a judgment against the
[borrower], their obligation is not independent," because the guarantor defendants "guaranteed
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the payment only of such debts as the [borrower] might at any time 'owe' to plaintiffs." 162
A.2d at 889. The same is true here.
F. ITB's factual mischaracterizations and references to facts
not in the record are irrelevant.
ITB devotes extensive effort to characterizing various facts not relevant to the
interpretation of the Guaranty Agreement, including Christian's assertion of defenses below, and
whether ITB was "fair" to Christian in pursuing a receivership. Christian already rebutted these
mischaracterizations in detail in his summary judgment briefing below (see CR 355-357) and
refers the Court to that rebuttal. Suffice to say that these mischaracterizations may be viewed as
an attempt to obscure the real issues, i.e., determining whether the Guaranty Agreement is
ambiguous and whether the District Court erred by contradicting the plain meaning of the
primary definitional term of the Agreement.
The Court should ignore ITB's factual dissembling in its entirety and focus on the
legal issue at hand: whether the Guaranty Agreement is ambiguous. This must be determined
from the Agreement itself.
G. The statutory provision that a secured promissory note is
unenforceable unless the underlying deed of trust is
foreclosed applies to ITB, and its argument to the contrary
is frivolous.
Lastly, ITB argues that "the anti-deficiency statute is not applicable to a sale by a
receiver."

It asserts that because the sale of the collateral occurred other than through

foreclosure, the anti-deficiency statutes have no application to it and it "has contractual rights
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under the Note to recover" from Trinity, and "no applicable statute prevents recovery of the
debt."

Respondent's Brief, p. 30. It cites no authority for this proposition.
The statute contains no such limitation. To the contrary, it plainly prohibits a

creditor from enforcing an underlying note where the collateral is disposed of in any manner
other than a trustee's sale in foreclosure. I.C. § 45-1503(1) provides in pertinent part:
If any obligation secured by a trust deed is breached, the
beneficiary may not institute a judicial action against the grantor or
his successor in interest to enforce an obligation owed by the
grantor or his successor in interest unless:
(a) The trust deed has been foreclosed by advertisement and sale
in the manner provided in this chapter and the judicial action is
brought pursuant to section 45-1512, Idaho Code[.]
(Emphasis added).
Thus, a creditor may enforce a promissory note secured by a deed of trust only
after foreclosure and sale of real property pursuant to the deed of trust. First Interstate Bank v.
Eisenbarth, 123 Idaho 895, 898 (Ct. App. 1993) ("[U]nder I.C. § 45-1503 ... no action can be
maintained for the recovery on a promissory note secured by a deed of trust, unless the action is
coupled with an action to foreclose the deed of trust, except where it is shown that the security
has become substantially valueless."). ITB's argument is frivolous.
ITB's after-the-fact attempt to rationalize its failure to sue the borrower on the
balance of the note fails. There is no evidence in the record to support that attempt, and the law
plainly prohibited it from suing the borrower after it chose receivership over foreclosure. By its
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own choice, it eliminated any further obligation by the borrower to it, and the borrower no longer
owed it anything.
III.

CONCLUSION

The Guaranty Agreement expressly limits Christian's guaranty obligation to "the
Indebtedness," which in tum is defined as, and limited to, amounts "Borrower owes or will owe
Lender." It is undisputed that the Borrower no longer owes any amount to ITB, because ITB
waived any right to further recovery from the Borrower by pursuing a receivership instead of a
foreclosure.

In concluding that the Guaranty Agreement is unambiguous, the District Court

effectively read the plain and ordinary meaning of "amounts Borrower owes or will owe to
Lender," out of the Agreement. Nothing in ITB's briefing or the District Court's comments
support the conclusion that the plain and ordinary meaning of "owes or will owe" means "no
longer obligated to repay." The one source ITB does cite actually supports Christian's position.
Even if other parts of the Agreement suggest a broad obligation, they cannot be relied upon to
give the primary definition of the guaranty obligation exactly the opposite of its widely
recognized plain and ordinary meaning. The District Court erred and its decision should be
reversed.
Dated this 20 th day of November, 2012.
MARCUS, CHRlSTIAN, HARDEE & DA VIES, LLP
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Attorneys for Defendant!Appellant
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